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1.1 Background and objectives 
There have been concerns that financial statements do not reflect adequately the underpinning 
drivers of value in modern business (Bernanke 2011; Haskel and Westlake 2017; Lev and Gu 
2016). Additionally, International Accounting Standard (IAS) 38 Intangible Assets, which 
governs the treatment of intangible assets, has been criticised for reflecting prudence and 
conservatism and encourages the expensing of internally generated intangible assets (Mazzi et 
al. 2019b). This implies that the accounting treatment of internally generated intangible assets, 
as prescribed by the standard, exacerbates the perceived lack of intangible assets in companies’ 
balance sheets.  
To shed more light on these conjectures, a study by Mazzi et al. (2019b) has among other 
things examined the relevant amounts and firm characteristics of a very large sample of firms 
across the world that capitalise and/or expense research and development (R&D) expenditure, 
specifically under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). However, in today’s 
economies, companies increasingly invest in software, develop websites as well as other 
software (eg applications for mobile phones) for use as part of their operations, but that are not 
necessarily heavily involved in R&D activities. Thus firms could find themselves spending 
significant software-related amounts. Such expenditure should be capitalised, subject to 
meeting the criteria, and shown as a separate category of intangible assets. As such, prior 
literature that has examined the capitalisation of development costs more broadly has not 
separately analysed the relevant costs recognised on companies’ financial statements. 
The present study complements and extends the study by Mazzi et al. (2019b) by focusing 
particularly on software development costs (SDCs), which are governed by the same 
accounting standard (ie IAS 38). To the best of the authors’ knowledge, research on the 
frequency and likelihood of SDC capitalisation and relevant amounts capitalised on companies’ 
balance sheets under IFRS is not available. Furthermore, there is an absence of evidence on the 
characteristics of firms that are more likely to capitalise such expenditure and on the 
determinants of the amounts of SDC capitalised. The overall objective of the present research 





By drawing on listed companies from 39 countries (40,241 firm-year observations) that have 
either converged their national standards to IFRS or adopted IFRS, for the five-year period 
2015 to 2019, we have collected and summarised evidence on how many companies capitalise 
SDCs during the year (capitalisers) and how many report R&D costs in the income statement 
but do not capitalise SDCs during the year (non-capitalisers). This evidence is provided in 
aggregate and on a country and industry level. We also provide descriptive statistics of the 
amounts of SDC capitalised in a given year relative to market values and the net amounts of 
SDC that feature on companies’ balance sheets, relative to total assets, at the end of the year. 
We then provide results from multivariate regression analysis to identify the country- and firm-
level determinants influencing the decision of companies to capitalise SDC and identifying the 
factors affecting the magnitude of SDC capitalised in a given year.  
In additional analysis with a separate sample, we explored any differences in the 
determinants influencing the decision of companies to capitalise SDCs and the factors affecting 
the magnitude of SDCs capitalised for a sample period that covers the same number of years 
before and after the implementation of IFRS 3 Business Combinations (Revised) in 2009. 
Finally, for a relatively small number of firms, we collected companies’ most recent annual 
reports and, from those, we manually extracted examples of voluntary disclosure and 
accounting policy notes about capitalisation or expensing of SDCs.  
 
1.3 Main findings 
➢ The data shows that 62.2% of the firm-year observations in the sample capitalise SDCs. 
This suggests that companies very frequently recognise and report SDCs separately. 
Moreover, from the multivariate analysis we conducted, we identified a significant 
number of non-capitalisers that, given their firm- and country-level characteristics, one 
would have expected to capitalise SDCs. This would increase the percentage of 
capitalisers of SDCs even further.  
➢ In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa and Spain, more than 80% of the firm-year 
observations are of firms that are capitalisers. In fact, all firm-year observations from 
Colombia and Philippines are capitalisers. 
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➢ The constituents of Consumer Discretionary, Financials, Real Estate and Utilities 
Sectors exhibit the largest proportion of capitalisers (the proportion of capitalisers is 
greater than 70%). 
➢ The high frequency of SDC capitalisation identified holds, even though the amounts 
involved can be considered immaterial relative to companies’ total assets and/or market 
values. Specifically, we note that the mean (median) SDC asset intensity on the balance 
sheet is 0.6% (0.2%) of capitalisers’ total assets. Further, the mean (median) SDC asset 
capitalised in the year is 0.04% (0.1%) of capitalisers’ market values. However, the 
large proportion of firms from Asia, which exhibit the lowest net SDCs intensity (mean 
(median) 0.32% (0.11%) of total assets), distorts the picture in relation to the SDC asset 
intensity of the overall sample.   
➢ Firms from Oceania (represented by firms from New Zealand and Australia) exhibit the 
highest intensity (mean (median) 2.22% (1.32%) of total assets). European firms and 
South African firms tend to present the second highest values of SDC assets as a  
proportion of total assets (mean (median) for Europe: 1.51% (0.73%); mean (median) 
for South Africa: 1.28% (0.66%)).  
➢ Firms in the Telecommunications industry exhibit the highest net SDC asset intensity 
(mean (median) 1.26% (0.37%) of total assets), followed by firms in Technology and 
Consumer Discretionary (mean (median) is 1.06% (0.28%) and 0.80% (0.26%) of total 
assets, respectively). Although firms in the Financials Sector have the highest 
proportion of capitalisers, net SDC asset intensity is of intermediate level when 
compared with other industries. 
➢ In particular, of the firm-year observations that complete material business 
combinations in a given year (4,076), a large proportion (3,115 firm-year observations 
– 76.4%) capitalise SDCs during the year (this represents 12.06% of the firms that 
capitalise SDCs in the entire sample). Additionally, we identify 1,028 firm-year 
observations that capitalise research and development (R&D) in the year (this 
represents 13.80% of the firm-year observations that capitalise R&D in the year in the 
entire sample). Moreover, for the firms that capitalise SDCs during the year, the mean 
(median) SDC intensity is 1.1% (0.3%) of total assets, while the mean (median) SDC 
capitalised in the year is 0.5% (0.1%) of market values. 
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➢ Compared with those that do not capitalise SDCS, companies that take the decision to 
capitalise SDCs tend to be larger, riskier, with higher leverage, to have more 
international sales, to have incentives to capitalise SDCs to meet their earnings targets, 
to capitalise other development costs and to have concluded material business 
combinations during the year. They are also more likely to employ one of the Big Four 
auditors. The same characteristics associate positively with the magnitude of the 
amounts capitalised. 
➢ Nonetheless, firm size, employing a Big Four auditor, and international sales are not 
significant factors affecting the decision to capitalise SDCs for the sub-sample of firms 
that have material business combinations. Further, book to market, firm size, having a 
Big Four auditor, international sales, and frequency of R&D capitalisation and being 
headquartered in a civic-law country or a country with highly skilled labour and better 
health infrastructure are not significant determinants of the amounts of SDCs 
capitalised in the sub-sample with material business combinations. Hence, these factors 
are significant determinants of SDC capitalisation only for the sub-sample of firms that 
do not have material business combinations. 
➢ The results from the separate sample focusing on the years before and after the 
implementation of IFRS 3 (R) in 2009 suggest that the implementation of the revised 
standard does not influence a firm’s decision about capitalising SDCs or the magnitude 
of SDC capitalisation, even if it has conducted material business combinations. 
 
1.4 Policy implications and recommendations 
The issue of intangible assets has been on the agenda of standard setters and regulators for 
some time and it is increasingly gaining momentum. For example, in 2015, as a response to the 
request for views on the Agenda Consultation of the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) agreed that there is a need for 
a review of the guidance for intangible assets and R&D. Moreover, in the UK in 2019, the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), following a project it had carried out and a request for 
feedback from stakeholders, published proposals for business reporting of intangibles (FRC 
2019). Additionally, in late 2019, the intangibles research unit within the European Financial 
Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) held discussions on intangibles in relation to the IASB’s 
forthcoming Agenda Consultation and, ‘at the meeting, IFRS IC [Interpretations Committee] 
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members noted that a fundamental overhaul of the Standard was necessary’ (EFRAG 2019: 2). 
In response to these voices, the IASB, in its request for information on what its priorities should 
be over the following five years, included revisiting IAS 38 as one of its potential projects 
(IASB 2021: Table 5). Further, even though in 2017 the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) reported that it was undertaking a project aiming to review, among other things, the 
mandatory disclosures for intangibles (FASB 2018), it has now initiated a project on 
accounting for and disclosure of intangibles, including internally developed intangibles and 
R&D (FASB 2021). Against this backdrop, the findings of the present research are very timely 
and speak directly to these projects. The findings should also be relevant to regulators more 
broadly, and to companies and auditors. With regard to SDCs in particular, the key 
recommendations arising from our findings are summarised as follows. 
(i) Our findings of high frequency of capitalisation of SDCs, even though the amounts 
involved can be considered relatively small, are in direct contrast to the prior evidence 
of relative lack of capitalisation of development costs of new products and processes 
(ie R&D-related costs) under IAS 38. We conjecture that such costs can be more 
reliably estimated at the time when the related projects are undertaken. Further, the 
SDCs’ duration of development can also be estimated with relative reliability over a 
shorter time period. These two features allow companies to establish their internal use, 
rather than applying an external market condition for product development, with greater 
relative reliability and this enables capitalisation of such costs. Along these lines, a 
relevant method of amortisation or monitoring for impairment can be established. 
Nonetheless, the stringent criteria for the recognition of development costs deter 
companies from capitalising other development costs equally frequently. Thus, if the 
IASB proceeds by revising/replacing IAS 38, reconsideration of the conditions of 
capitalising developments costs is pertinent. This would improve the accounting 
treatment and comparability of other intangible assets. 
(ii) Our findings on the frequency of SDC capitalisation and magnitude of related amounts 
capitalised for the periods before and after IFRS 3 (R) reveal that the IASB’s 
expectation for ‘an increase in the intangible assets recognised as a result of business 
combinations’ (IASB, 2014: 13) following the implementation of IFRS 3 (R) did not 
materialise. This holds for all firms conducting business combinations and for those for 
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which the combinations were material. Further, our findings for the companies that 
have conducted material business combinations in the most recent sample period 
suggest that the majority of these firms do recognise SDC (and even other development 
assets) separately. In fact, the corresponding amounts appear to be higher than those 
from all SDC capitalisers in the sample. This suggests that companies do follow IFRS 
3 and recognise separately such assets upon material business combinations. The 
finding also reinforces views regarding the differential treatment and resultant influence 
in the frequency of recognition of intangible assets on companies’ balance sheets (see 
in IASB 2021). In combination, this suggests that the generally perceived lack of 
recognition of intangible assets more broadly lies with IAS 38. 
(iii) Our findings indicate significant differences between the percentage of SDC-
capitalising firms and SDC asset intensity on companies’ balance sheets across 
countries/regions. While firms from Asia demonstrate a clear tendency to recognise 
SDCs separately on the balance sheet, the SDC asset intensity is far smaller than for 
firms in those regions, such as Oceania and Europe, where capitalisation is less 
frequent. Given this, users of financial statements, preparers, auditors and/or enforcers 
of financial information should be alerted of the differential reporting incentives and 
contextual, or cultural, influential factors across different countries, which result in 
significant variations in reporting practices. The concept of materiality for triggering 
separate disclosure of SDC assets and the perceived importance of SDCs evidently have  
different weight across different jurisdictions. On the other hand, SDC intensity across 
different sectors appears less variable and percentage of capitalisers is more 
explicable/less unexpected. 
(iv) Finally, in contrast to the evidence about lack of disclosures in relation to R&D, our 
findings from reviewing the disclosures in companies’ annual reports indicate some 
good disclosure practice for SDCs. Given the lack of mandatory disclosures for either 
topic in IAS 38, the good practice we have observed rests on companies’ voluntary 
disclosure behaviour. Arguably, the higher frequency of recognition of SDCs ‘forces’ 
companies to ‘talk’ about the amounts recognised, despite the relative lack of 
materiality. Even so, in the cases where business combinations are not present, we have 
observed that companies do not explicitly explain how much of the cost capitalised 
relates to in-house development or externally acquired software. Arguably, IAS 38, 
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enforcing bodies and auditors could be encouraged to support more transparent 
disclosures by assisting firms to distinguish how much of the capitalised amounts 
relates to externally acquired or internally developed software. 
 
1.5 Report outline 
The next chapter describes the accounting for SDCs and an overview of the relevant accounting 
standards and literature. The research design is outlined in Chapter 3. We then present and 
discuss our results in Chapter 4. Conclusions are set out in Chapter 5. 
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2. Accounting for Software Development Costs – overview of relevant 
accounting standards and literature 
2.1 Overview of relevant accounting standards 
Under an IFRS reporting regime, accounting for SDCs and associated capitalisation of relevant 
expenditure is governed primarily by IAS 38 Intangible Assets and less so by IFRS 3 Business 
Combinations.  
IAS 38 prescribes (paragraph 21) that an intangible asset shall be recognised if, and only 
if:  
(a) it is probable that the expected future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset 
will flow to the entity; and  
(b) the cost of the asset can be measured reliably.  
Second, paragraphs 25 and 26 explain, ‘the probability recognition criterion in paragraph 21(a) 
is always considered to be satisfied for separately acquired intangible assets’ and ‘the cost of a 
separately acquired intangible asset can usually be measured reliably’.  
IAS 38 further covers the accounting for internally generated intangible assets, including 
R&D costs, of which SDCs form a constituent element. All research costs are expensed. 
Development costs must be capitalised on meeting the six conditions specified in paragraph 57 
of the standard; all other costs are expensed. The six conditions can be applied to cover those 
costs incurred in relation to the internal development and use of software or its development 
for sale, as set out below. 
‘An intangible asset arising from development (or from the development phase of an 
internal project) shall be recognised if, and only if, an entity can demonstrate all of the 
following: 
‘(a) the technical feasibility of completing the intangible asset so that it will be available 
for use or sale;  
‘(b) its intention to complete the intangible asset and use or sell it;  
‘(c) its ability to use or sell the intangible asset;  
‘(d) how the intangible asset will generate probable future economic benefits. Among other 
things, the entity can demonstrate the existence of a market for the output of the 
intangible asset or the intangible asset itself or, if it is to be used internally, the 
usefulness of the intangible asset;  
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‘(e) the availability of adequate technical, financial and other resources to complete the 
development and to use or sell the intangible asset;  
‘(f) its ability to measure reliably the expenditure attributable to the intangible asset during 
its development’.  
Within IAS 38, specific guidance is also provided in relation to software (including that 
developed internally) that is integral to the use of property, plant and equipment. Specifically, 
‘computer software for a computer-controlled machine tool that cannot operate without that 
specific software is an integral part of the related hardware and it is treated as property, plant 
and equipment. The same applies to the operating system of a computer. When the software is 
not an integral part of the related hardware, computer software is treated as an intangible asset’ 
(IAS 38, para 4).  
Recognising the growing importance of website development for internal use and as a sales 
platform, SIC-32 Intangible Assets – Web Site Costs was issued in March 2002. This confirms 
that a website developed by an entity using internal expenditure, whether for internal or 
external access, is an internally generated intangible asset that is subject to the requirements of 
IAS 38, and specifically those conditions specified in para 57 for capitalisation. SIC-32 
identifies four stages of website development. Firstly, ‘planning application and infrastructure 
development’, which is akin to the research phase, so all costs are expensed. Secondly, 
‘graphical design development’ is akin to the development stage and costs are to be capitalised 
if they meet the conditions specified in IAS 38. Owing to websites’ susceptibility to 
technological obsolescence, SIC 32 specifies that where costs are capitalised, the expected 
amortisation period should be short, consistent with that set out in IAS 38 para 92. Finally, for 
‘content development’ that is developed to advertise and promote an enterprise's own products 
and services and costs in the ‘operating phase’ are expensed.  
In addition to these considerations, as part of a business combination, as of the acquisition 
date, the acquirer must, among other things, recognise, separately from goodwill, the 
identifiable assets acquired (IFRS 3, para 10). Specifically, the acquirer’s application of this 
recognition principle and conditions may result in recognising some assets (including software) 
that the acquiree had not previously recognised as assets in its financial statements because it 
developed them internally and charged the related costs to expense (IFRS 3, para 13). As a 
result, while consolidating subsidiaries, SDCs’ value on a company’s balance sheet would 
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increase, not only because of recognising SDCs already on the balance sheet of the acquiree 
but also because of the newly recognised SDCs on consolidation. 
In this study, we shed light to all relevant costs recognised on companies’ balance sheets. 
 
2.2 Related literature 
Despite the plethora of literature about general R&D costs and associated capitalisation (see in 
Mazzi et al. (2019a; 2019b) and Dargenidou et al. (2021) for relevant references), there is a 
sparsity of literature on accounting for SDCs under IAS 38. This is despite the growth in 
importance of automated systems and production planning, the development of apps, 
cybersecurity challenges and risks, artificial intelligence and big data analytics (Morgan 
Stanley 2017). Indeed, the body of literature relevant to SDCs has been confined to US-based 
studies (Aboody and Lev 1998; Ciftci 2010; Dinh et al. 2019; Givoly and Shi, 2008; Krishnan 
and Wang 2014; Mohd 2005).  
This is motivated by the different accounting treatments, under US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), for R&D and SDCs. Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standard (SFAS) No. 2 requires immediate expensing of R&D costs. Significantly, in contrast 
to this, capitalisation (and subsequent amortisation) of development costs of software intended 
for sale is mandated by SFAS No. 86 (effective from 31 December 1985), once technological 
feasibility has been established for a computer software product. Further to this, SOP 98-1 
(effective from 15 December 1998) similarly requires capitalisation of SDCs related to 
software for internal use during the application development stage (Para 21), where it is 
‘probable that the project will be completed and the software will be used to perform the 
function intended’ (Para 27b). All other costs are expensed. The different accounting 
treatments of SDCs and R&D have been attributed to the strength of lobbying from the software 
industry to recognise assets rather than expensing all costs (Kaplan and Sandino, 2001). As 
noted earlier, under IAS 38 the accounting for SDCs is the same whether the software is 
developed for internal use or for sale.  
Within the extant literature, the focus of the majority of the US-based studies, in the post 
SFAS 86 era, has been to examine the value relevance of SDC capitalisation. Aboody and Lev 
(1998: 162–3) find that ‘annually capitalized development costs are positively associated with 
stock returns and the cumulative software asset reported on the balance sheet is associated with 
stock prices’. Further, they find no support for the view that the judgement involved in software 
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capitalisation decreases the quality of reported earnings. Mohd (2005) finds that within the 
software industry information asymmetry is significantly lower for capitalisers than for those 
that expense SDCs and capitalisers have a resultant lower cost of capital. Indeed, he argues that 
expensing leads to ambiguity about the value of R&D and hence greater information 
asymmetry for investors. Consistent with this reasoning, Givoly and Shi (2008) similarly report 
that capitalising SDCs reduces information asymmetry and the under-pricing of IPOs and 
consequently lowers cost of capital. These findings are in stark contrast to Ciftci, who reports 
that ‘capitalization of software costs does not improve earnings quality’ and that the findings 
‘suggest that investors’ perception of earnings quality is higher for firms that make a 
conservative reporting choice’ (Ciftci 2010: 429). He concludes that the earnings quality of the 
firms that expense all R&D is greater than that of those that capitalise, recognising the 
possibility of earnings management.  
In another study, revealing more positive evidence of SDC capitalisation, Krishnan and 
Wang (2014) find that SDC capitalisation sends a positive signal of a reduction of business risk 
to auditors, with a consequent decrease in audit fee. Nonetheless, this is where such 
capitalisation is inconsequential for beating analysts’ forecasts and also for firms with a low 
level of following by analysts. Finally, Dinh et al. (2019) contrasting the accounting for SDCs 
versus R&D in other industries found that capitalisation mitigated the likelihood of under-
investment and similarly mitigated the likelihood of a cut in discretionary spend.  
Overall, these studies highlight the generally positive evidence of the value relevance and 
signalling of SDC capitalisation. While there is some contrary evidence, and the possibility 
that capitalisation will be used as an earnings management tool, nonetheless the literature 
supports the asset recognition of appropriate SDCs.  
In a non-US context, to our knowledge the only study of accounting for SDCs in other 
jurisdictions is that of Walker and Oliver (2005). Their research examined the differences and 
inconsistencies in capitalisation and asset recognition between US, UK, Australian and IAS 
accounting treatments of development costs of software intended for internal use, before the 
adoption of IAS 38. IAS 38 and the US accounting treatment have already been covered in this 
review: both mandate capitalisation on meeting specified, although different, conditions. In 
contrast, the UK accounting standard SSAP 13 Accounting for Research and Development 
(1989) allowed, but did not require, this treatment on meeting conditions for asset recognition. 
Similarly, Australian Accounting Standard AAS 13 Accounting for Research and Development 
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Costs (1983), and the identically titled AASB 1011 (1987) permitted capitalisation of 
expenditure on the development of a ‘new product’, to the extent that such costs ‘are expected 
beyond reasonable doubt to be recoverable’, given future (uncertain) projections. To remove 
these inconsistencies in accounting treatments, Walker and Oliver (2005: 67) argue for ‘clarity 
in accounting rules governing the treatment of software expenditure’.  
Further to this divergence of treatments, they argue more widely that the application of 
capitalisation through the relevant accounting standards is reliant on a series of subjective 
judgements, such as those about technological feasibility, commercial viability and economic 
life. This in turn may be susceptible to earnings management owing to pressures on earnings 
performance or internal bonus incentive structures. In conclusion, Walker and Oliver (2005: 
88) advocate ‘(a) the immediate expensing of internally developed software; (b) reporting of 
this expense as a line item where software expenditure is material; and (c) disclosing, in notes 
to the financial statements, information about major software development projects’. Such a 
conclusion is counter to IAS 38, the focus of this research, and widely adopted after 2005 
outside the US, where capitalisation of SDCs remains mandated where the specified conditions 
are met. 
As a summary, no research exists on the capitalisation of SDCs under IFRS or outside the 
US. Therefore, this is the first study to examine the frequency and magnitude of SDC 
capitalisation of IFRS reporting firms, the factors associated with such practices and the 
amounts involved.   
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3. Research approach 
3.1 Sample selection 
Given that we are interested in exploring companies’ relatively recent practices in relation to 
the objectives of the study and that we wanted to involve as many countries as possible that 
have adopted IFRS or converged their accounting standards to IFRS or permit listed companies 
to report under IFRS, the sample selection started by identifying all countries that met these 
conditions as of 2015, and we then included all periods between 2015 and 2019 in our analysis. 
To identify these countries, we relied on the relevant guide published by the IFRS Foundation 
on the use of IFRS by jurisdiction.1 For each of those countries, we obtained the research lists 
constructed by Worldscope containing all active and dead firms for the years 2015 to 2019. 
From these lists, we eliminated instruments not classified as equity.2 As far as cross-listed firms 
were concerned, we retained only those firms based on the country of primary listing. 
Subsequently, we eliminated 33,402 firm-year observations of firms not reporting under IFRS 
(or local GAAP, for those countries that had converged their accounting standards with IFRS).3 
To avoid the influence of potential transition effects on our findings (Mazzi et al. 2019b), we 
eliminated any observations of firms that appeared to have adopted IFRS for the first time in a 
given year (mostly 2015 (31%) and 2016 (28%): 4,141 firm-year observations). Further, we 
eliminated 949 firm-year observations because the reporting period of the firms concerned was 
more than 380 or less than 350 days (García Lara, García Osma and Mora 2005; Dargenidou 
et al. 2021). Then, we eliminated 6,960 firm-year observations because either the firms’ 
industry classification information was missing or they were in the Energy industry.4  
Subsequently, given the objectives of the study (ie to focus on firms that have recognised 
SDCs on the balance sheet in a given year), we considered the following aspects. According to 
IAS 38, and assuming that the firm considers the relevant amounts to be sufficiently material, 
such expenditure that is capitalised should be shown as a separate category of intangible assets. 
Further, SDCs could be part of what a company could define as R&D and thus the SDC-related 
amount expensed in the income statement might be ‘badged’ as R&D expenses. Hence, in a 
 
1 See <https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/>, accessed 16 April 2021 
2 We require the Datastream item TYPE to be equal EQ, indicating an equity instrument.  
3 As in Schleicher et al. (2010) and Daske et al. (2013) and Mazzi et al. (2019a), we rely on the Worldscope item 
‘accounting standards followed (WC07536) to identify the accounting standards that a company reports.  
4 As explained by Mazzi et al. (2019a), exploration and evaluation expenses could be recorded as research and 
development expenses in the database for companies in this industry. It is noted that in previous ICB Industry 
namings (and hence earlier literature which used those) this industry was titled ‘Oil and Gas’.  
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given year, we required our sample firms to have either an SDC asset recognised on the balance 
sheet and/or an R&D expense in the income statement. Because of this requirement, we 
eliminated 67,378 firm-year observations that did not report R&D expense or recognise an 
SDC asset in a given year. Additionally, we eliminated 12,872 firm-year observations with 
missing firm-specific data and/or negative book value of equity, and 2,739 for which we could 
not identify whether the company had concluded business combinations in a given year. 
Finally, we deleted 1,041 firm-year observations because of missing country-specific data. The 
final sample consists of 40,241 firm-year observations, corresponding to 12,239 firms across 
39 countries. The sample selection process is summarised in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Sample selection 
 Firm-year 
observations 
We focus on the countries that, as of 2015, had adopted IFRS or had converged 
their accounting standards to IFRS, or permitted listed companies to report under 
IFRS. Our sample begins in 2015 and ends in 2019. 
169,723 
Excluding companies that do not report under IFRS (or local standards that have 
converged with IFRS) 
(33,402) 
Excluding firm-year observations that relate to a firm that adopted IFRS for the 
first time in a given year 
(4,141) 
Excluding firm-year observations of firms that changed their reporting period (949) 
Excluding firms in the energy sector or that have missing industry classification 
information 
(6,960) 
Excluding firm-year observations of firms with no R&D expense or SDC asset 
recognised in a given year 
(67,378) 
Excluding firm-year observations of firms with negative book value of equity 
and/or missing firm-specific data  
(12,872) 
Excluding firm-year observations of firms with missing information on whether 
they had concluded business combinations 
(2,739) 
Excluding firm-year observations of firms with missing country-specific data (1,041) 
Final sample [t=2015, 2019][12,239 firms] 40,241 
 
Before discussing the sample distribution by country and year, we note the following. 
Appendix A presents tabulated information and discussion about the firm-year observations 
with no R&D expense or SDC asset recognised in a given year that we have excluded, after we 
have eliminated firm-year observations with missing firm or country-specific data (ie 37,438 
firm-year observations). This information indicates that among all the firm-year observations 
with available data (ie 77,679 – calculated as the sum of total excluded (ie 37,438 firm-year 
observations) and total included (ie 40,241 firm-year observations) in the analysis) and thus we 
could have analysed, approximately 52% report an R&D expense in the income statement 
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and/or recognise an SDC asset in a given year and hence are included in the study. This 52% 
or ‘retention rate’ indicates that, overall, we include in our sample a large number of firms from 
a large number of IFRS reporting countries. Even so, we note that for 11 (5) countries the 
retention rate is below 30% (20%). On the other hand, for China and Japan (Korea and Taiwan) 
the retention rate is above 90% (80%). This suggests that, compared with other countries, a 
significant majority of firms in these countries report an R&D expense in the income statement 
and/or recognise an SDC asset in the year. Further, from descriptive statistics for key firm-
level variables, we observe that, on average, firms excluded from the analysis (ie firms that do 
not report R&D expense in the income statement and did not recognise an SDC asset on the 
balance sheet) are smaller in size and more leveraged, have significantly lower levels of 
international sales, and invest more in capital expenditure; a lower percentage of them are 
audited by a Big Four auditor. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the sample distribution by country and year, and industry and 
year, respectively. The latter classification is based on the 10 industries specified by the 
Industry Classification Benchmark. These tables indicate that our sample is heavily populated 
by Asian firms (63.89%) and in particular firms from China (11,058 firm-year observations), 
Taiwan (6,481 firm-year observations), Korea (4,986 firm-year observations) and India (3,184 
firm-year observations). The high ‘retention rate’ for China, Korea and Taiwan (see earlier 
discussion) and the fact that there are a very large number of firms listed in China, Korea and 
Taiwan, explains why our sample heavily represents firms in the Asian region. The next 
country with a large representation in the sample which is not in Asia is the UK, with 2,094 
firm-year observations.5 The remaining countries all have fewer than 2,000 firm-year 
observations and the weight of some countries is much smaller, reflecting the comparable sizes 
of equity markets.  
As regards industry representation, the sample consists primarily of firms in the in the 
Industrials (9,056 firm-year observations), Consumer Discretionary (7,449 firm-year 
observations), Technology (6,401 firm-year observations), Basic Materials (5,101 firm-year 
observations) and Health Care (3,808 firm-year observations). The remaining industries are 
also well represented in our sample. The exceptions are Real Estate and Utilities, which have 
the lowest number of firm-year observations in our sample (915 and 991 firm-year 
 
5 49% retention rate as per Appendix A (Table A1). 
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observations, respectively). We note that, in Appendix A (Table A2), our sample includes the 
majority of potential firms (ie high retention rate) in the Health Care (76%), Technology (74%) 
and Telecommunications (69%) industries from the countries we analyse. Hence, it is not 
surprising these are the most represented in our overall sample. 
The firm-year observations across years range from the lowest of 6,528 in 2015 to the 
highest of 9,021 in 2018. The lower numbers for 2015 and 2016 can be explained by the fact 
that we have excluded many firms for which this was the first year of IFRS adoption (see earlier 
discussion and in Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.2: Sample distribution by country and year 
Country Region 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total 
Argentina America 15 15 18 20 16 84 
Australia Oceania 216 253 264 285 308 1,326 
Austria Europe 24 25 22 21 21 113 
Belgium Europe 39 44 40 40 41 204 
Brazil America 93 93 90 98 107 481 
Canada America 223 201 201 190 215 1,030 
Chile America 46 57 60 71 73 307 
China Asia 1,868 2,117 2,392 2,601 2,080 11,058 
Colombia America 0 5 4 5 4 18 
Denmark Europe 25 31 39 38 35 168 
Finland Europe 47 51 48 59 52 257 
France Europe 167 182 184 203 166 902 
Germany Europe 171 182 193 209 205 960 
Greece Europe 51 57 57 56 26 247 
Hong Kong Asia 247 260 311 367 306 1,491 
India Asia 398 569 631 697 889 3,184 
Indonesia Asia 64 68 80 93 78 383 
Ireland Europe 17 19 11 16 16 79 
Israel Asia 96 100 96 103 100 495 
Italy Europe 47 60 58 70 65 300 
Japan Asia 23 55 79 117 140 414 
Jordan Asia 20 22 14 11 7 74 
Korea Asia 561 1,046 1,073 1,156 1,150 4,986 
Malaysia Asia 72 69 66 69 49 325 
Mexico America 21 27 18 20 3 89 
Netherlands Europe 39 49 51 49 48 236 
New Zealand Oceania 41 46 50 49 42 228 
Norway Europe 36 41 40 46 41 204 
Peru America 17 12 16 14 1 60 
Philippines Asia 2 2 2 3 3 12 
Portugal Europe 10 11 16 15 8 60 
Singapore Asia 11 11 10 10 51 93 
South Africa Africa 78 84 88 89 91 430 
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Spain Europe 45 59 56 60 61 281 
Sweden Europe 90 100 105 127 125 547 
Switzerland Europe 1 2 3 4 2 12 
Taiwan Asia 1,132 1,262 1,317 1,371 1,399 6,481 




382 419 435 464 394 2,094 
Total  6,528 7,805 8,345 9,021 8,542 40,241 
 
Table 3.3: Sample distribution by industry and year 
Industry 2015 2016 2,017 2,018 2,019 Total 
Basic Materials 881 988 1,026 1,111 1,095 5,101 
Consumer 
Discretionary 1,202 1,456 1,568 1,687 1,536 7,449 
Consumer Staples 440 525 576 605 564 2,710 
Financials 284 403 449 478 486 2,100 
Health Care 632 731 769 842 834 3,808 
Industrials 1,459 1,750 1,898 2,048 1,901 9,056 
Real Estate 146 186 194 197 192 915 
Technology 1,046 1,245 1,301 1,438 1,371 6,401 
Telecommunications 271 327 364 393 355 1,710 
Utilities 167 194 200 222 208 991 
Total 6,528 7,805 8,345 9,021 8,542 40,241 
Industry classification is based on the 10 industries specified by the Industry Classification Benchmark (FTSE 
Russell 2020). 
 
3.2 Econometric analysis 
3.2.1 Determinants of the decision to capitalise SDCs, and amounts of SDC capitalised 
One of the primary aims of this project is to identify the factors that affect a firm’s decision to 
capitalise SDCs and the magnitude of SDCs capitalised in a given year. For the former, we 
used multivariate Probit analysis with the dependent variable being an indicator variable 
(SDCAPD). This is equal to one (1) when a company capitalises SDCs during the year and zero 
(0) otherwise. For the latter, we used multivariate Tobit models (left censored) with the 
dependent variable being the amount of SDCs capitalised during the year, scaled by the market 
value of the firm (SDAsset). Given the absence of previous research in this area under IFRS, 
we followed existing literature that examines the capitalisation of R&D-related assets in 
choosing firm-level factors that may affect the decision or magnitude of SDCs’ capitalisation 
(see Dargenidou et al. 2021 and Mazzi et al. 2019b).  
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Following that literature, the factors that we considered for capturing a firm’s life cycle 
and risk were: book to market (BM), size (SIZE), beta (BETA), leverage (LEV) and age (AGE). 
We also included a binary variable that is equal to one (1) if the financial statements are audited 
by a Big Four firm (Big4) and zero (0) otherwise. We also included the level of investment in 
tangible fixed assets (CAPEX). Additionally, we controlled for a firm’s international exposure 
by including the percentage of international sales (INTSALES). Moreover, we included the 
magnitude of total R&D expenditure relative to total assets (RDInt) and the market value of 
the firm generated in relation to R&D (RDValue). We also included variables that capture a 
firm’s incentives for manipulating earnings to meet or beat the previous year’s earnings 
(PAST_BEAT) or a zero-earnings threshold benchmark (ZERO_BEAT). We also included an 
indicator variable that is equal to one (1) if a company capitalises other development costs 
during the year (CAP) and zero (0) otherwise, and an indicator variable that is equal to one (1) 
if the company concluded material combinations (individually or collectively) during the year 
(BC)6 and zero (0) otherwise.  
We also controlled for institutional influences in the country of domicile with the following 
variables: anti-self-dealing index (ANTISELF), control of corruption (CORR) and an indicator 
variable that is equal to one (1) if a country is classified as having a civil law system and zero 
(0) if it has a common law system (CIV_COM). Additionally, we considered the following 
potential factors that may affect the overall levels and productivity of R&D in the economy: 
health infrastructure (Healthinfrastructure), skilled labour (Skilledlabour), scientific research 
legislation (Scientificresearchlegislation) and GDP growth (GDPGrowth). Finally, all our 
multivariate tests included industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix B7 and a generic 
representation of the models we applied is expressed in Equation 3.1. 
 
Equation 3.1 
SDCAPD or SDAsset = f(BM, SIZE, BETA, LEV, BIG4, CAPEX, INTSALES, RDValue, RDInt, 
PAST_BEAT, ZERO_BEAT, CAP, BC, AGE, ANTISELF, CIV_COM, CORR, 
 
6 The consideration accounts for 5% of the previous year's book value of equity. 




Healthinfrastructure, Skilledlabour, Scientificresarchlegislation, GDPGrowth)  
   
3.2.2 Expected vs unexpected treatment of SDCs 
Subsequently, in the spirit of the analysis in Mazzi et al. (2019b) and Kreß et al. (2019), we 
investigated whether firms follow the expected accounting treatment of capitalising or not 
SDCs. This analysis involved two stages.  
In the first stage, we identified as ‘mandatory non-capitalisers’ firms that do not have SDC 
capitalised and we would anticipate that they would not have capitalised such costs in the 
following circumstances. 
a) The firm does not capitalise SDCs or other development costs and all other firms in the 
same industry and in the same year do the same. This provides a signal that firms in this 
industry-year cluster would not capitalise SDCs.  
b) The firm’s RDValue is negative; this is a signal that R&D and SDC expenditure are 
perceived by the market (and the companies themselves) as having no future economic 
benefit and thus should not be capitalised.8  
c) The RDValue of a non-capitaliser is lower than the minimum RDValue of a capitaliser9 
in the same industry-year. This criterion ensures that the remaining non-capitalisers are 
at least as successful in R&D and SDC expenditure as the least successful capitaliser.  
 
In the second stage, we examined whether the remaining firms (ie capitalisers and non-
capitalisers, excluding ‘mandatory non-capitalisers’) could be classified in the alternative 
category. To address this, we relied on equation (3.1), used earlier to examine the determinants 
of each firm’s decision about capitalising SDCs. Subsequently, we measured the probability 
that a firm would be a capitaliser, given the control variables in place, by obtaining the fitted 
values from this regression. If the predicted probability is higher than 50% then the firm is 





8 It is noted that RDvalue is measured as the difference between the market value of equity and book value of 
equity less the amount of R&D and SDC capitalised during the year, divided by the sum of current and lagged 
annual R&D expenditure. 
9 As also explained in the next section, for firm-year observations that capitalise SDCs during the year, the firms 
are classified as ‘capitalisers’ and the remaining firms are classified as ‘non-capitalisers’. 
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4. Findings and discussion 
4.1 Capitalisers of software development costs 
Our sample comprises 40,241 firm-year observations across 39 countries (see section 3.1). For 
firm-year observations that capitalise SDCs during the year, the firms are classified as 
‘capitalisers’ and the remaining firms are classified as ‘non-capitalisers’. In total, we have 
14,422 non-capitalisers (36%) and 25,819 (64%) capitalisers. Within the capitalisers, 10,818 
recognise only an SDC asset on the balance sheet and no R&D expense in the income statement 
in a given year. This information is shown in Table 4.1.  
The significantly large number of SDC capitalisers is striking when compared with 
previous literature examining the capitalisation of R&D under IFRS among large international 
samples. More specifically, from their international sample with almost 21,000 firm-year 
observations, Mazzi et al. (2019b) identify approximately 38% of their sample as capitalising 
R&D costs. Similarly, Kreß et al. (2019) identify about 33% of their international sample of 
firm-year observations as being capitalisers of R&D costs. This initial finding indicates that 
companies do capitalise SDCs relatively frequently. In fact, they are more likely to report an 
SDC asset and less likely to report other types of development assets on the balance sheet. 
Consistent with this, we have identified only 7,449 of the 40,241 firm-year observations as 
recognising an R&D asset in the year.  
 
Table 4.1: Sample composition of capitalisers and non-capitalisers 
Final sample [t=2015, 2019][12,239 firms] 40,241 (100.00%) 
1. Reporting expensed R&D in the income statement and no SDC capitalised 
in the balance sheet in a given year (non-capitalisers) 
14,422 (35.84%) 
2. Reporting SDC capitalised in the year (capitalisers) 25,819 (64.16%) 
2.1 Capitalising SDC in the balance sheet and recognising no R&D expense 
in the income statement in a given year  
10,818 (26.88%) 
2.2 Reporting both SDC capitalised in the balance sheet and R&D expense 
in the income statement in the year  
15,001 (37.28%) 
3. Capitalising R&D in the year  7,449 (18.51% of 
full sample) 
3.1 Capitalising SDC and R&D in the balance sheet in the year 4,963 (12.33% of 
full sample) 
 
The data reveals the frequency with which companies capitalise such costs across the five-year 
sample period. Specifically, Table 4.2 shows that 20.96% of the capitalisers capitalise SDCs 
every year, while 17.70% of the capitalisers capitalise such costs in four of the five-year sample 
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periods. The observations in our sample of firms that capitalise SDCs in only one year is only 
a very small proportion of the total sample (4.89%).  
 
Table 4.2: Firm-year observations of firms capitalising SDCs by year 
Capitalisers 25,819 (64.1%*) 
Capitalisers in one year of the sample period only  1,966 (4.89%*) 
Capitalisers in two years of the sample period only 3,338 (8.30%*) 
Capitalisers in three years of the sample period only 4,956 (12.32%*) 
Capitalisers in four years of the sample period 7,124 (17.70%*) 
Capitalisers in all five years of the sample period 8,435 (20.96%*) 
*of the full sample of 40,241 (100.00%) firm-year observations 
 
Figure 4.1 plots the percentage of firm-year observations capitalising SDCs by country. We 
note that in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa and Spain more than 80% of the firm-year 
observations are capitalisers. In fact, all firms from Colombia and Philippines are capitalisers. 
This indicates a significantly large proportion of SDC capitalisers for IFRS reporters in these 
countries in a given year. At the other end of the spectrum, in Austria, Finland, Jordan, 
Switzerland and Turkey, fewer than 40% of the firm-year observations in our sample capitalise 
SDCs. Switzerland has the lowest percentage of capitalisers (17%). Canada, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Jordan, Korea, Sweden, Taiwan and China exhibit intermediate proportions of 
capitalisers but they generally have higher proportions of non-capitalisers (ranging between 
40% and 50%). On reviewing the ‘retention rates’ shown in Appendix A (Table A1), we note 
that the sample ‘retention rate’ for China and (Korea and Taiwan) is above 90% (80%). This 
and the data shown in Figure 4.1 allow us to say with confidence that about half of the listed 
companies in China recognise an SDC asset across the sample period, while this percentage is 
much lower for Korea and Taiwan.  
Figure 4.2 plots the percentage of firm-year observations capitalising SDCs by industry. 
We note that all industries exhibit more capitalisers than non-capitalisers. The constituents of 
Consumer Discretionary, Financials, Real Estate and Utilities exhibit the largest proportion of 
capitalisers (the proportion of capitalisers in these is greater than 70%). Firms in the 
Technology, Health Care and Basic Materials industries have the lowest proportion of 
capitalisers (56%, 52% and 51%, respectively). Nevertheless, these percentages can be 
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considered relatively high if one considers the data in Appendix A (Table A2), where we show 
that our sample includes the majority of potential firms in the Health Care (76%) and 
Technology (74%) industries. 
In order to delve further into the proportion of capitalisers across industries, we have also 
relied on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Sectors (ie more refined sub-categories 
of industries) in which the companies operate. Figure 4.3 shows that in those Sectors the 
proportion of capitalisers exceeds 70%. Notably, all firms in Banks, Insurance (Life & Non-
life) and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS) capitalise SDCs. The Sectors with the next 
highest proportions of capitalisers are Finance & Credit Services (98%), Travel & Leisure 
(93%), Real Estate, Investment & Services (93%) and Investment Banking & Broker (91%). 
In untabulated descriptive statistics, we see that Sectors with the lowest proportion of 
capitalisers include: Medical Equipment Services (47%), Pharmaceutical & Biotech (50%) and 
Leisure Goods (50%). The remaining Sectors have a higher proportion of non-capitalisers 
relative to capitalisers. Overall, these results confirm the earlier findings shown in Figure 4.2 
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Figure 4.2: Proportion of capitalisers and non-capitalisers across industries 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Proportion of capitalisers and non-capitalisers for Sectors with a high 
proportion of capitalisers 
 
 
As part of IFRS 3 requirements, when companies complete a business combination they should 
recognise other intangible assets acquired (including SDCs) separately from goodwill. To 
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explore the influence of business combinations on companies’ SDC intensity levels and 
frequency of annual capitalisation, we explore the 4,076 firm-year observations that conclude 
material business combinations during the year and present relevant information in Table 4.3.  
Of these firm-year observations, a large proportion (3,115 firm-year observations – 76.4%) 
capitalise SDCs during the year (this represents 12.06% of the firms that capitalise SDCs during 
the year in the entire sample). Of these, 1,347 fully capitalise SDCs and do not expense any 
R&D (this represents 12.45% of such companies in the entire sample). Additionally, we note 
that 1,028 firm-year observations exhibit material business combinations and capitalise R&D 
in the year (this represents 13.80% of the firm-year observations that capitalise R&D in the 
year in the entire sample). Of these, 741 firm-year observations capitalise both R&D and SDCs 
(this represents 14.93% of the firms in the entire sample that recognise both types of intangibles 
during the year). Overall, these results indicate that the majority of companies that conclude 
material business combinations do recognise software and other development assets.   
 
Table 4.3: Firm-year observations of firms with material business combinations 
Reporting material business combinations  
(The consideration accounts for 5% of the previous year's book value of 
equity.) 
4,076 (100.00%) 
1. Reporting expensed R&D in the income statement and no SDC 
capitalised in the balance sheet in a given year (non-capitalisers) 
961  
(6.66% of full sample non-
capitalisers)  
2. Reporting SDC capitalised in the year (capitalisers) 3,115  
(12.06% of full sample 
capitalisers)  
2.1 Capitalising SDC in the balance sheet and recognising no R&D 
expense in the income statement in a given year 
1,347 (12.45%  
of such companies in the full 
sample)  
3. Capitalising R&D in the year 1,028 (13.80% of those 
capitalising R&D in the year) 
3.1 Capitalising R&D and SDC in the year 741 (14.93% of those 
capitalising SDC and R&D in 
the year)  
 
4.2 SDC capitalisation intensity 
To give more insights into the importance of SDCs on companies’ financial statements, this 
section reflects on the net SDCs on the balance sheet, scaled by total assets. First, we note that 
the mean (median) SDC asset intensity on the balance sheet is 0.6% (0.2%) of capitalisers’ 
total assets (see sdnetasset in Table 4.4). Further, the mean (median) SDC asset capitalised in 
the year is 0.04% (0.10%) of capitalisers’ market values (see SDAsset in Table 4.4). Delving 
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further in the data, from untabulated information, we see that for the 6,222 firm-year 
observations in the top quartile of SDC asset intensity, the mean (median) SDC intensity is 
2.1% (1.3%) of total assets while the mean (median) SDC asset capitalised in the year is 1% 
(0.5%) of market values. Interestingly, 71% of the firms from Oceania that report a net SDC 
asset on the balance sheet are in this top quartile. Firm-year observations from Europe and 
Africa follow, with 58% and 56%, respectively. Only 13% of the firm-year observations from 
Asia that show a net SDC asset on the balance sheet are in the top quartile. This information 
suggests that the large proportion of firms from Asia distorts the picture of the amounts 
recognised across the overall sample. In fact, for non-Asian firms, the amounts of SDCs 
recognised on the balance sheet are far from negligible.  
Among the subset of firm-year observations that conclude a material business combination 
(see also in Table 4.3), from untabulated information, we note the following. For the firms that 
capitalise SDCs during the year, the mean (median) SDC intensity is 1.1% (0.3%) of total 
assets, while the mean (median) SDC capitalised in the year is 0.5% (0.1%) of market values. 
Further, for the firms that fully capitalise SDCs and do not expense any R&D, the mean 
(median) SDC intensity is 1.4% (0.6%) of total assets, while the mean (median) SDC 
capitalised in the year is 0.8% (0.3%) of market values. For the firms that capitalise R&D in 
the year, the mean (median) SDC intensity is 0.8% (0.1%) of total assets, while the mean 
(median) SDC capitalised in the year is 0.4% (0.1%) of market values. Finally, for the firms 
that capitalise both R&D and SDCs, the mean (median) SDC intensity is 1.2% (0.4%) of total 
assets, while the mean (median) SDC capitalised in the year is 0.5% (0.1%) of market values. 
This suggests not only that companies that conclude material business combinations recognise 
software and other development assets but also that the amounts involved are not negligible 
and, in fact, these amounts appear to be higher than those from all capitalisers in the sample 
(see Table 4.4).  
Figure 4.4 shows the yearly median value of net SDC intensity across each industry in our 
sample. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the nature of their operations, firms in 
Telecommunications exhibit the highest net SDC intensity (mean (median) 1.26% (0.37%) of 
total assets), followed by Technology and Consumer Discretionary (mean (median) is 1.06% 
(0.28%) and 0.80% (0.26%) respectively of total assets). Nonetheless, we note that the median 
value for firms in the Telecommunications industry has been decreasing over the last five years. 
Real Estate firms have the lowest median values of net SDC intensity (mean (median) 0.22% 
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(0.02%) of total assets), although Real Estate firms include a relatively large proportion of 
capitalisers (see Figure 4.2). The remaining industries exhibit intermediate levels of net SDC 
intensity. Although firms in the Financials Sector have the highest proportion of capitalisers 
(see Figure 4.2), net SDCs intensity is intermediate when compared with other industries.  
Figure 4.5 plots the yearly median values of net SDC intensity for each of the geographic 
areas/regions to which the countries included in our sample belong.10 Firms from Oceania (ie 
firms from New Zealand and Australia) exhibit the highest intensity (mean (median) 2.22% 
(1.32%) of total assets). European and South African firms tend to present the second- and 
third-highest values of SDC assets in proportion to total assets (mean (median) for Europe: 
1.51% (0.73%); mean (median) for Africa: 1.28% (0.66%) of total assets). Firms from Asia, 
exhibit the lowest net SDC intensity (mean (median) 0.32% (0.11%) of total assets). This, and 
the fact that firms from this region represent the largest proportion of our sample (63.89%, see 
Table 3.2), explains the relatively low SDC intensity levels across the full sample and brings 
to light an interesting feature of the firms in Asia. Although many of them report separately an 
SDC asset capitalised or an R&D expense, the amounts capitalised on the balance sheet are far 
smaller than corresponding amounts in other regions. 
At a broader level, the information in these graphs demonstrates that, on average, 
companies appear to have a relatively stable investment in software as reflected on their 
balance sheets, with no increasing trend relative to total assets over the last five years.  
 
 
10 Drawing on Table 3.2, Africa includes firms from South Africa while America includes firms from Argentina, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Asia includes firms from China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan. Finally, Europe includes firms from 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 4.4: Net software asset intensity across industries 
 
Yearly median net SDC asset on the balance sheet, scaled by total assets. 
Figure 4.5: Net software asset intensity across regions 
 
Yearly median net SDC asset on the balance sheet, scaled by total assets. 
 
Further, to demonstrate the variation in the way companies describe the reasons behind their 
investment in SDCs, along with the relevant disclosures provided within their financial 
statements, we drew on the annual reports of 100 random firms from our sample that have high 
SDC asset intensity and come from different sectors and different countries and regions. 
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selected from this analysis and that could be considered examples of good disclosure practice, 
including mentions of SDC capitalisation as a key audit matter in auditors’ reports.  
 
4.3 Univariate analysis 
Table 4.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in equation 3.1, shown 
separately for capitalisers and non-capitalisers. We also compare the mean (median) values of 
each variable across the two groups through a T-test (Mann-Whitney test). Before we outline 
the key observations from these descriptive statistics, it is noted that these descriptive statistics 
are taken in isolation of one another. Hence, some findings may seem contradictory if viewed 
as interdependent. 
The results indicate that, when compared with non-capitalisers, capitalisers tend to:  
✓ document lower amounts of R&D expense in the income statement (mean RDExp = 
0.014 for capitalisers vs. mean RDEXp = 0.037 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01)  
✓ document lower amounts of R&D intensity (mean RDInt = 0.023 for capitalisers vs. 
mean RDInt = 0.043 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01)  
✓ document lower amounts of capital expenditure (mean CAPEX = 0.055 for capitalisers 
vs. mean CAPEX = 0.061 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01) 
✓ document lower incentives to capitalise software development costs for meeting 
earnings benchmarks (eg mean BENCH_BEAT = 0.190 for capitalisers vs. mean 
BENCH_BEAT = 0.224 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01) 
✓ be marginally larger in size (mean SIZE = 18.576 for capitalisers vs. mean SIZE = 
18.111 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01)  
✓ be riskier (mean BETA = 1.003 for capitalisers vs. mean BETA = 0.924 for non-
capitalisers; p<0.01) 
✓ be more leveraged (mean Leverage = 0.827 for capitalisers vs. mean Leverage = 0.591 
for non-capitalisers; p<0.01).  
✓ have concluded almost twice as many material business combinations (mean BC = 
0.121 for capitalisers vs. mean BC = 0.067 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01)  
✓ report materially higher R&D value (mean RDValue = 420.781 for capitalisers vs. mean 
RDValue = 117.959 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01) 
✓ be audited less frequently by Big Four audit firms (mean BIG4 = 0.369 for capitalisers 
vs. mean BIG4 = 0.461 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01) 
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✓ document lower amounts of R&D development asset on the balance sheet (mean 
rdnetasset = 0.001 for capitalisers vs. mean rdnetasset = 0.001 for non-capitalisers; 
p<0.01).  
With respect to country-level characteristics, T-test and Mann-Whitney tests indicate that, 
compared with non-capitalisers, capitalisers tend to operate in countries with: 
✓ higher levels of investor protection (mean ANTISELF = 0.650 for capitalisers vs. mean 
ANTISELF = 0.599 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01) 
✓ higher levels of corruption (mean CORR = -65.333 for capitalisers vs. mean CORR = -
74.226 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01) 
✓ higher levels of GDP growth (mean GDPGrowth = 3.352 for capitalisers vs. mean 
GDPGrowth = 2.204 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01) 
✓ marginally lower levels of skilled labour (mean Skilledlabour = 5.710 for capitalisers 
vs. mean Skilledlabour = 5.792 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01) 
✓ marginally lower levels of scientific research legislation (mean 
Scientificresearchlegislation = 5.941 for capitalisers vs. mean 
Scientificresearchlegislation = 6.052 for non-capitalisers; p<0.01) 
✓ lower levels of health infrastructure (mean Healthinfrastructure = 6.002 for capitalisers 




Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics across capitalisers and non-capitalisers 
 Capitalisers (25,819 firm-year observations) Non-capitalisers (14,422 firm-year observations) Comparison 




rdnetasset 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.050 -0.001*** 0.000*** 
sdnetasset 0.006 0.013 0.000 0.002 0.082 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.006*** 0.002*** 
SDAsset 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004*** 0.001*** 
SDCAPD 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 1 
RDExp 0.014 0.032 0.000 0.002 0.280 0.037 0.053 0.000 0.017 0.280 -0.023*** -0.015*** 
RDAsset 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.058 -0.001*** 0.000*** 
CAP 0.192 0.394 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.172 0.378 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.020*** 0.000*** 
BM 0.637 0.568 0.035 0.468 3.926 0.774 0.658 0.035 0.593 3.926 -0.137*** -0.125*** 
SIZE 18.576 4.186 8.699 18.072 30.873 18.111 4.901 8.699 17.584 30.873 0.465*** 0.488*** 
BETA 1.003 0.693 -1.435 0.980 6.764 0.924 0.665 -1.435 0.906 6.764 0.079*** 0.074*** 
LEV 0.827 1.281 0.000 0.412 8.107 0.591 0.956 0.000 0.298 8.107 0.236*** 0.114*** 
BIG4 0.369 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.461 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.092*** 0.000*** 
CAPEX 0.055 0.088 0.000 0.024 0.606 0.061 0.096 0.000 0.025 0.606 -0.006*** -0.001** 
INTSALES 25.667 33.194 0.000 6.200 100.000 27.933 36.121 0.000 3.315 100.000 -2.266*** 2.885*** 
RDValue 420.781 2122.403 -5900.000 26.080 27000.000 117.959 906.082 -5900.000 7.224 27000.000 302.822*** 18.856*** 
RDInt 0.023 0.044 0.000 0.008 0.395 0.043 0.073 0.000 0.017 0.395 -0.020*** -0.009*** 
PAST_BEAT 0.168 0.374 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.190 0.392 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.022*** 0.000*** 
ZERO_BEAT 0.037 0.189 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.057 0.232 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.020*** 0.000*** 
BENCH_BEAT 0.190 0.392 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.224 0.417 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.034*** 0.000*** 
AGE 16.300 9.327 3.000 16.000 46.000 16.316 8.722 3.000 16.000 46.000 -0.016 0 
BC 0.121 0.326 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.067 0.249 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.054*** 0.000*** 
ANTISELF 0.650 0.183 0.165 0.725 1.000 0.599 0.183 0.165 0.565 1.000 0.051*** 0.160*** 
CIV_COM 0.708 0.455 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.777 0.417 0.000 1.000 1.000 -0.069*** 0.000*** 
CORR -65.323 20.214 -99.519 -57.692 -36.058 -74.226 17.727 -99.519 -79.327 -36.058 8.903*** 21.635*** 
Healthinfrastructure 6.002 1.618 1.510 5.940 8.746 6.956 1.297 1.510 7.388 8.746 -0.954*** -1.448*** 
Skilledlabour 5.710 0.601 3.077 5.702 7.532 5.792 0.543 3.077 5.685 7.532 -0.082*** 0.017*** 
Scientificresearchlegislation 5.941 0.977 3.028 5.895 8.064 6.052 0.876 3.028 5.904 8.064 -0.111*** -0.009*** 
GDPGrowth 3.352 6.273 -36.279 4.171 15.154 2.204 5.976 -36.279 2.861 15.154 1.148*** 1.310*** 
Definitions and source of all the variables are reported in Appendix B. 
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4.4 Multivariate analysis 
4.4.1. Full sample 
As the univariate analysis provided earlier does not necessarily identify influential factors 
associated with the decision to capitalise SDCs or the amounts of SDCs capitalised, Table 4.5 
provides four models of multivariate analysis, presenting the empirical implementation of 
Equation 3.1 for the entire sample. The dependent variables are the decision to capitalise 
(Models 1 and 2) and the amount of SDCs capitalised in a given year (Models 3 and 4). The 
models differ only in the use of alternative measures to proxy for incentives to manipulate 
earnings by SDCs. Specifically, Models 1 and 3 employ PAST_BEAT and ZERO_BEAT while 
Models 2 and 4 use BENCH_BEAT. The latter effectively combines PAST_BEAT and 
ZERO_BEAT as it is also a binary variable and indicates if PAST_BEAT or ZERO_BEAT is one 
(1). 
For firm-level determinants of the decision to capitalise SDCs, SIZE, BETA, LEV, BIG4, 
INTSALES, PAST_BEAT, ZERO_BEAT, CAP and BC report a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient. This suggests that companies more likely to decide to capitalise SDCs 
are larger, riskier, have higher leverage, employ one of the Big Four auditors, have more 
international sales, have incentives to capitalise SDCs to meet their earnings targets and 
capitalise other development costs, and have concluded material business combinations during 
the year. Conversely, firms with greater growth opportunities (high book-to-market ratio) and 
higher R&D intensity are less likely to capitalise SDCs (coefficients of BM and RDInt are 
negative and statistically significant).  
Looking at the coefficients of the country-level variables, we infer that firms likely to 
decide to capitalise SDCs are headquartered in countries with more skilled labour and better 
scientific research legislation (Skilledlabour and Scientificresearchlegislation have positive 
and statistically significant coefficients). Instead, non-capitalisers are more likely to operate in 
countries with better health infrastructure (Healthinfrastructure has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient). 
The coefficients reported in Models 3 and 4  indicate that almost all factors associated with 
the decision to capitalise SDCs are also associated with the amounts of SDCs capitalised and 
in the same direction. The only exception/additional factor is being headquartered in countries 




Table 4.5: Multivariate analysis (decision and magnitude of SDCs capitalisation) 
    Decision to capitalise SDCs Magnitude of SDCs capitalisation 
VARIABLES Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
BM  -0.192*** (-8.59) -0.191*** (-8.55) -0.109*** (-9.23) -0.108*** (-9.17) 
SIZE  0.019*** (5.12) 0.019*** (5.12) 0.009*** (4.89) 0.009*** (4.89) 
BETA  0.048*** (3.08) 0.048*** (3.09) 0.022*** (2.93) 0.022*** (2.94) 
LEV  0.045*** (3.86) 0.045*** (3.89) 0.015*** (3.41) 0.015*** (3.45) 
BIG4  0.133*** (4.56) 0.133*** (4.56) 0.054*** (3.61) 0.054*** (3.61) 
CAPEX  -0.021 (-0.15) -0.019 (-0.13) 0.048 (0.66) 0.049 (0.68) 
INTSALES 0.002*** (6.19) 0.002*** (6.19) 0.001*** (7.09) 0.001*** (7.09) 
RDValue  0.000*** (4.18) 0.000*** (4.19) 0.000*** (3.85) 0.000*** (3.87) 
RDInt  -2.789*** (-11.04) -2.737*** (-10.95) -1.788*** (-11.34) -1.756*** (-11.24) 
PAST_BEAT 0.100*** (4.85)   0.052*** (4.91)   
ZERO_BEAT 0.095** (2.31)   0.054** (2.34)   
BENCH_BEAT   0.101*** (5.08)    0.052*** (5.12) 
CAP  0.192*** (6.06) 0.192*** (6.06) 0.118*** (7.52) 0.118*** (7.52) 
BC  0.319*** (10.05) 0.319*** (10.07) 0.152*** (11.60) 0.153*** (11.63) 
AGE  -0.032 (-1.56) -0.032 (-1.55) -0.015 (-1.47) -0.014 (-1.46) 
ANTISELF 0.105 (0.96) 0.105 (0.97) 0.141*** (2.70) 0.141*** (2.70) 
CIV_COM -0.020 (-0.45) -0.020 (-0.45) 0.021 (1.14) 0.021 (1.14) 
CORR  0.001 (0.62) 0.001 (0.61) 0.000 (0.81) 0.000 (0.79) 
Healthinfrastructure -0.285*** (-16.70) -0.285*** (-16.69) -0.135*** (-16.85) -0.135*** (-16.85) 
Skilledlabour 0.064** (2.34) 0.063** (2.33) 0.046*** (3.77) 0.046*** (3.76) 
Scientificresearchlegislation 0.057** (2.40) 0.056** (2.38) 0.030** (2.50) 0.030** (2.48) 
GDPGrowth -0.002 (-0.93) -0.002 (-0.91) -0.001 (-1.08) -0.001 (-1.06) 
Constant  0.523** (2.27) 0.522** (2.27) 0.340*** (3.42) 0.340*** (3.42) 
Observations 40,241  40,241  40,241  40,241  
r2_p  0.155  0.155  0.0941  0.0940  
chi2/F  2217***  2215***  83.63**8  86.13***  
MeanVIF  6.04  6.03  6.04  6.03  
Robust z-statistics (t-statistics for regressions on magnitude) in parentheses. We include industry and year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Definitions and sources of all the variables are reported in Appendix B. 
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4.4.2 Expected and unexpected accounting treatment of SDCs’ capitalisation 
Following the procedure described in section 3.2.2, from the 14,422 firm-year observations of 
non-capitalisers in our sample, we identified 6,484 firm-year observations as ‘mandatory non-
capitalisers’. Thus, arguably, the remaining non-capitalisers in our sample (7,938 firm-year 
observations) could potentially capitalise SDCs. From these, we find that the vast majority 
(6,058) follow the unexpected method (not capitalising) and thus could capitalise SDCs. 
Further, from the firm-year observations that actually capitalise SDCs, a small (large) 
proportion follow the unexpected (expected) method, ie 1,341 (24,485). Table 4.6 summarises 
this information.  
 
Table 4.6: Companies following the ‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’ accounting treatment 
 Non-capitalisers Capitalisers 
 Mandatory non-
capitalisers 
Potential capitalisers  
Full sample [40,241 
observations] 
6,484 7,938 25,819 
Expected method – 
1,880 






Unexpected method – 
6,058 
(ie they are expected to 
be capitalisers) 
1,341 
(ie they are 
expected to be 
non-capitalisers) 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of firm-year observations following the unexpected method 
for each country in our sample. All firms from Argentina, Brazil, Greece, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Mexico, Peru, Portugal and South Africa that do not capitalise SDCs and are not 
classified as ‘mandatory non-capitalisers’ could have capitalised such expenditure at least 
partially. It is noted that, most of these are countries with low ‘retention rates’ in our sample 
(see Appendix A – Table A1). Hence, in combination, this suggests that these countries have a 
very small proportion of firms with an indication of some R&D expense in the income 
statement and even smaller proportion capitalising SDC assets in a given year. Other countries 
with high proportions of unexpected non-capitalisers include China, Jordan, Italy and Hong 
Kong. Firms from Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, France and Spain have the highest 
percentage of unexpected capitalisers. On the other side of the spectrum, firms from Argentina, 
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Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, 
South Africa and Switzerland, do not have any unexpected capitalisers.  
 
Figure 4.6: Percentage of unexpected non-capitalisers and capitalisers by country 
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Figure 4.7 plots the percentage of firm-year observations following the unexpected method by 
industry. We note that all industries have a higher proportion of unexpected non-capitalisers 
(excluding ‘mandatory non-capitalisers’) than of unexpected capitalisers. Firms operating in 
Real Estate and Financials present the highest percentages of unexpected non-capitalisers. 
Further, firms in these industries have no unexpected capitalisers. Interestingly, firms in these 
industries also exhibit the highest (lower) percentage of capitalisers (non-capitalisers) (see 
Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.7: Percentage of unexpected non-capitalisers and capitalisers by industry 
 
 
Overall, these results suggest that firms that capitalise SDCs are mostly those that would be 
expected to do so. Further, some non-capitalisers would be expected to capitalise some amounts 
of such expenditure, given their firm-level and country-level characteristics. Moreover, firms 
in specific industries, such as Real Estate and Financials, where we observe large proportions 
of capitalisers, appear to have even more companies that could have capitalised SDCs than 
other sectors. 
 
4.4.3 SDC capitalisation and material business combinations 
As indicated in Table 4.4, firms that are capitalisers of SDCs have concluded significantly more 
material business combinations than non-capitalisers. We also see from the results in Table 4.5 











% unexpected non-capitalisers % unexpected capitalisers
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that having concluded a material business combination in a given year is indeed positively 
associated with the likelihood of being a capitaliser and the amounts of SDCs capitalised in the 
year. Given these results and the expectation that firms with material business combinations in 
a given year are probably different from firms that do not conclude such a combination,11 in 
this section the sample is split across these two sub-samples. We explore whether the two 
samples have different determinants for the decision to capitalise SDCs and the amounts they 
capitalise in a given year. Table 4.7 presents the results of our multivariate analysis in four 
models for each sub-sample. Similar to the main regression results, the first two models 
examine the decision to capitalise SDCs and the latter two examine the determinants of the 
magnitude of the amounts capitalised.  
Some of the results on the decision to capitalise SDCs are similar to the main findings: ie, 
whether firms have concluded a material business combination or not, the likelihood of 
deciding to capitalise SDCs is higher when firms have higher betas and leverage and when 
companies have incentives to capitalise SDCs to meet earnings targets and have capitalised 
R&D costs. Further, firms headquartered in countries with more skilled labour and better 
scientific research legislation are more likely to capitalise SDCs. At the same time, firms with 
higher R&D intensity and those that operate in a country with lower health infrastructure are 
less likely to capitalise their software costs, irrespective of conducting material business 
combinations. Having greater growth opportunities (ie higher book to market), being larger in 
size, employing a Big Four auditor, and/or having more international sales are not significant 
for the sub-sample of firms that have material business combinations. Hence, these factors are 
significant determinants of SDC capitalisation for the sub-sample of firms that do not have 
material business combinations. Moreover, we find that firms headquartered in countries with 
common law and higher corruption levels are more likely to capitalise SDCs when they have 
concluded material business combinations in a given year, although these are not significant 
determinants for the full sample.  
The coefficients reported in Models 3 and 4 indicate that, whether a company has a 
material business combination or not, factors associated with higher amounts of SDCs 
capitalised are: being riskier (ie having higher beta), being more leveraged, having lower R&D 
intensity, having incentives to capitalise larger amounts of SDCs for meeting earnings targets 
 
11 In untabulated descriptive statistics, indeed, we identify significant differences in most of the firm-level and 
country-level characteristics of firms with and without material business combinations. 
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or benchmarks, and being headquartered in countries with higher investor protection. 
Nonetheless, book to market, firm size, having a Big Four auditor, having more international 
sales, having more frequent R&D capitalisation and being headquartered in a civic-law country 
or a country with highly skilled labour and better health infrastructure are not significant 
determinants of the amounts of SDCs capitalised in the sub-sample of firms with material 
business combinations. Hence, these characteristics are related to the levels of SDCs 
capitalisation only for firms without material business combinations. In fact, health 
infrastructure environment has a statistically significant coefficient, albeit with the opposite 
sign across the two sub-samples. Overall, these findings suggest that firms with a material 
business combination in a given year have different determinants for the decision to capitalise 




Table 4.7: Multivariate analysis across firms with and without material business combinations  
  Decision to capitalise Magnitude of capitalisation 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BC = 0 BC = 1 BC = 0 BC = 1 BC = 0 BC = 1 BC = 0 BC = 1 
BM -0.194*** -0.133* -0.194*** -0.117 -0.111*** -0.061* -0.111*** -0.054  
(-8.53) (-1.67) (-8.52) (-1.46) (-9.09) (-1.85) (-9.08) (-1.64) 
SIZE 0.024*** -0.012 0.024*** -0.013 0.012*** -0.006 0.012*** -0.006  
(6.29) (-0.94) (6.29) (-1.03) (6.03) (-1.20) (6.03) (-1.29) 
BETA 0.046*** 0.093** 0.047*** 0.092** 0.022*** 0.027* 0.022*** 0.027*  
(2.90) (2.02) (2.90) (1.99) (2.79) (1.75) (2.80) (1.72) 
LEV 0.041*** 0.078** 0.041*** 0.084*** 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.025***  
(3.39) (2.52) (3.39) (2.70) (2.91) (2.73) (2.91) (3.02) 
BIG4 0.143*** 0.086 0.143*** 0.084 0.061*** 0.030 0.061*** 0.027  
(4.79) (1.16) (4.80) (1.12) (3.88) (0.99) (3.89) (0.91) 
CAPEX -0.004 -0.317 -0.003 -0.363 0.051 -0.051 0.051 -0.063  
(-0.03) (-0.65) (-0.02) (-0.75) (0.68) (-0.29) (0.69) (-0.35) 
INTSALES 0.003*** -0.000 0.003*** -0.000 0.002*** -0.000 0.002*** -0.000  
(6.84) (-0.27) (6.85) (-0.32) (7.73) (-0.21) (7.73) (-0.23) 
RDValue 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000**  
(4.01) (1.64) (4.01) (1.73) (3.44) (2.04) (3.44) (2.21) 
RDInt -2.722*** -3.408*** -2.701*** -2.734*** -1.780*** -1.548*** -1.766*** -1.281***  
(-10.31) (-5.13) (-10.31) (-4.21) (-10.58) (-4.77) (-10.57) (-3.94) 


























CAP 0.227*** -0.048 0.227*** -0.057 0.141*** -0.017 0.141*** -0.019  
(6.97) (-0.69) (6.98) (-0.82) (8.44) (-0.61) (8.44) (-0.70) 
AGE -0.029 -0.016 -0.029 -0.019 -0.013 -0.005 -0.013 -0.007  
(-1.36) (-0.33) (-1.35) (-0.39) (-1.27) (-0.29) (-1.26) (-0.39) 
ANTISELF 0.084 0.239 0.085 0.243 0.134** 0.203** 0.135** 0.207**  
(0.75) (0.92) (0.76) (0.94) (2.44) (2.14) (2.45) (2.17) 
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CIV_COM 0.028 -0.213* 0.028 -0.218* 0.044** -0.064 0.045** -0.067  
(0.61) (-1.74) (0.62) (-1.79) (2.36) (-1.57) (2.37) (-1.63) 
CORR -0.000 0.008** -0.000 0.007** -0.000 0.003** -0.000 0.003**  
(-0.37) (2.05) (-0.36) (2.02) (-0.11) (2.40) (-0.11) (2.31) 
Healthinfrastructure -0.316*** -0.084* -0.316*** -0.086** -0.153*** -0.018 -0.153*** -0.019  
(-18.05) (-1.94) (-18.04) (-1.98) (-18.05) (-1.11) (-18.05) (-1.16) 
Skilledlabour 0.092*** -0.107* 0.092*** -0.108* 0.058*** -0.030 0.058*** -0.031  
(3.29) (-1.68) (3.29) (-1.70) (4.53) (-1.29) (4.53) (-1.31) 
Scientificresearchlegislation 0.079*** -0.076 0.079*** -0.074 0.042*** -0.034* 0.042*** -0.034*  
(3.17) (-1.49) (3.17) (-1.45) (3.25) (-1.66) (3.24) (-1.66) 
GDPGrowth -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.008 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002  
(-0.29) (-1.56) (-0.27) (-1.52) (-0.51) (-1.18) (-0.50) (-1.10) 
Constant 0.208 2.467*** 0.206 2.469*** 0.188* 1.219*** 0.187* 1.225***  
(0.89) (4.44) (0.88) (4.45) (1.81) (6.29) (1.80) (6.30) 
Observations 36,165 4,076 36,165 4,076 36,165 4,076 36,165 4,076 
r2_p 0.161 0.0904 0.161 0.0852 0.0969 0.0570 0.0968 0.0536 
chi2/F 2085*** 255.8*** 2084*** 240.2*** 83.68*** 7.470*** 86.29*** 7.219*** 
Mean VIF 1.98 2.21 2.01 2.24 1.98 2.21 2.01 2.24 
Robust z-statistics (t-statistics for regressions on magnitude) in parentheses. We include industry and year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  






4.4.4 Additional analysis: implementation of IFRS 3 (Revised) and capitalisation of SDCs 
The revised IFRS 3, which was effective for financial periods starting on or after 1 July 2009, 
and resultant changes in IAS 38 for recognition of intangible assets arising from business 
combinations, raised the expectation for ‘an increase in the intangible assets recognised as a 
result of business combinations’ (IASB 2014:13). To address this conjecture with particular 
regard to the recognition of SDCs, we focus on all countries that had adopted IFRS or had 
converged their accounting standards with IFRS by 2008. Subsequently, we followed the same 
sample selection approach discussed in Section 3.1. This time, however, we limited the sample 
period so that we considered the same number of years before and after the implementation of 
IFRS 3(R) (ie the earliest is 2006 and the latest is 2013) and we maintain only the firm-year 
observations for firms that made at least one business combination in the period before or after 
the implementation of IFRS 3(R). This yields a sample of c.6500 firm-year observations. We 
note that, in untabulated descriptive statistics, although the number of capitalisers increases 
slightly, the magnitude of capitalised SDCs and the net SDCs shown on the balance sheets is 
not different in the post IFRS 3R adoption period. 
In order to examine the effect of IFRS 3(R) adoption, we extended Model (1), discussed 
in Section 3.2, and included an indicator variable (POST), which is equal to one (1) for 
reporting periods ending after 1 July 2010 and zero (0) otherwise. We present the results of the 
multivariate analysis in Table 4.8. Our results show that the coefficients of POST are negative 
but insignificant (coefficients: -0.079, -0.079, -0.042 and -0.043, respectively; p-values >10%). 
These results suggest that the adoption of IFRS 3(R) does not have an influence on a firm’s 
decision to capitalise SDCs or the magnitude of SDC capitalisation.   
We expanded this analysis and repeated the same test for the sub-sample of firm-year 
observations only for those firms that had conducted a material business combination in any 
given year before and after the implementation of IFRS 3(R). We present the results of this 
multivariate analysis in Table 4.9. Our results show that the coefficients of POST are again 
negative but insignificant (coefficients: -0.079, -0.077, -0.035 and -0.034, respectively; p-
values>10%). These results suggest that the implementation of IFRS 3(R) does not influence a 
firm’s decision to capitalise SDCs or the magnitude of SDC capitalisation, even if it has 




Table 4.8: Multivariate analysis: the adoption of IFRS 3 (revised) 
  Decision to capitalise SDCs Magnitude of SDC 
capitalisation 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
POST -0.079 -0.079 -0.042 -0.043  
(-0.76) (-0.76) (-0.69) (-0.69) 
BM -0.169*** -0.166*** -0.105*** -0.103***  
(-2.76) (-2.73) (-2.69) (-2.66) 
SIZE -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007  
(-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.71) (-0.72) 
BETA 0.166** 0.165** 0.109** 0.109**  
(2.27) (2.26) (2.41) (2.40) 
LEV 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.073*** 0.073***  
(3.55) (3.56) (3.91) (3.93) 
BIG4 0.167** 0.166** 0.096* 0.095*  
(2.14) (2.13) (1.88) (1.87) 
CAPEX -0.066 -0.065 -0.026 -0.025  
(-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.14) (-0.13) 
INTSALES -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001  
(-1.36) (-1.35) (-1.13) (-1.12) 
RDValue -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
(-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.34) (-0.33) 
RDInt -3.663*** -3.583*** -2.586*** -2.529***  
(-3.94) (-3.88) (-3.81) (-3.75) 
PAST_BEAT 0.150***  0.101***   
(2.77)  (2.90)  
ZERO_BEAT 0.149  0.102   
(1.38)  (1.44)  
BENCH_BEAT  0.163***  0.108***  
 (3.09)  (3.22) 
CAP -0.277*** -0.278*** -0.179*** -0.180***  
(-3.07) (-3.08) (-2.85) (-2.88) 
BC 0.170*** 0.169*** 0.104*** 0.104***  
(3.54) (3.54) (3.50) (3.50) 
AGE 0.036 0.036 0.021 0.021  
(0.52) (0.51) (0.50) (0.50) 
ANTISELF -0.457 -0.462 -0.302 -0.305  
(-1.04) (-1.05) (-1.08) (-1.09) 
CIV_COM -0.585** -0.588** -0.389** -0.392**  
(-2.10) (-2.11) (-2.16) (-2.17) 
CORR 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
(0.24) (0.25) (0.34) (0.35) 
Healthinfrastructure -0.034 -0.034 -0.016 -0.016  
(-0.68) (-0.67) (-0.50) (-0.48) 
Skilledlabour -0.032 -0.032 -0.018 -0.018  
(-0.69) (-0.69) (-0.66) (-0.67) 
Scientificresearchlegislation -0.097* -0.097* -0.072** -0.072**  
(-1.90) (-1.90) (-2.29) (-2.29) 
GDPGrowth -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.005***  
(-3.08) (-3.07) (-2.80) (-2.80) 
Constant 1.281** 1.287** 1.071** 1.075***  
(2.03) (2.04) (2.57) (2.58) 
Observations 6,505 6,505 6,505 6,505 
r2_p 0.103 0.103 0.0661 0.0660 
chi2/F 202.6*** 202.0*** 6.168*** 6.317*** 
Mean VIF 3.4 2.71 3.4 3.46 
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Robust z-statistics (t-statistics for regressions on magnitude) in parentheses. We include industry and year fixed 
effects, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Definitions and 
sources of all the variables are reported in Appendix B. 
 
 
Table 4.9: Multivariate analysis: the adoption of IFRS 3 (revised) 
  Decision to capitalise 
SDCs 
Magnitude of SDC 
capitalisation 
VARIABLES Model  1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
POST -0.079 -0.077 -0.035 -0.034  
(-0.47) (-0.46) (-0.39) (-0.39) 
BM -0.059 -0.055 -0.040 -0.037  
(-0.54) (-0.51) (-0.65) (-0.61) 
SIZE 0.037 0.037 0.017 0.017  
(1.31) (1.31) (1.09) (1.09) 
BETA -0.002 -0.001 0.009 0.009  
(-0.01) (-0.01) (0.14) (0.14) 
LEV 0.260*** 0.261*** 0.103*** 0.104***  
(3.71) (3.72) (4.54) (4.56) 
BIG4 0.256** 0.252** 0.126* 0.124*  
(2.05) (2.03) (1.69) (1.65) 
CAPEX -0.757 -0.748 -0.351 -0.343  
(-1.33) (-1.31) (-1.20) (-1.18) 
INTSALES -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001  
(-1.16) (-1.14) (-0.91) (-0.89) 
RDValue -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000  
(-1.78) (-1.76) (-1.64) (-1.62) 
RDInt -4.451*** -4.351*** -2.760*** -2.685***  
(-3.34) (-3.31) (-3.13) (-3.08) 
PAST_BEAT 0.160**  0.094**   
(2.13)  (2.20)  
ZERO_BEAT 0.209  0.137   
(1.18)  (1.35)  
BENCH_BEAT  0.192**  0.113***  
 (2.56)  (2.67) 
CAP -0.327** -0.330** -0.199** -0.201**  
(-2.47) (-2.50) (-2.35) (-2.39) 
BC 0.177*** 0.175*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 
 (3.45) (3.42) (3.64) (3.61) 
AGE -0.016 -0.016 -0.008 -0.008  
(-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.14) (-0.14) 
ANTISELF -0.982 -0.986 -0.629 -0.631  
(-1.34) (-1.35) (-1.49) (-1.50) 
CIV_COM -1.417*** -1.419*** -0.869*** -0.870***  
(-2.97) (-2.97) (-3.21) (-3.22) 
CORR 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004  
(0.56) (0.54) (0.82) (0.81) 
Healthinfrastructure 0.109 0.109 0.068 0.068  
(1.33) (1.33) (1.47) (1.47) 
Skilledlabour 0.052 0.051 0.031 0.030  
(0.70) (0.69) (0.81) (0.79) 
Scientificresearchlegislation -0.240*** -0.241*** -0.146*** -0.147***  
(-2.77) (-2.80) (-3.23) (-3.24) 
GDPGrowth -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001  
(-0.58) (-0.61) (-0.32) (-0.35) 
Constant 1.233 1.235 1.162* 1.163*  
(1.20) (1.20) (1.85) (1.85) 
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Observations 2,957 2,957 3,000 3,000 
r2_p 0.142 0.142 0.0947 0.0946 
chi2/F 123.5*** 123.7*** 5.741*** 5.886*** 
Mean VIF 3.73 3.02 3.73 3.8 
Robust z-statistics (t-statistics for regressions on magnitude) in parentheses. We include industry and year fixed 
effects, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Definitions and 





5.1 Conclusions and recommendations 
While the wider topic of intangible assets and their accounting treatment has been on the 
agenda of standard setters and regulators for some time, there is no evidence on the frequency 
with which SDCs are capitalised or of the amounts concerned on the balance sheets of IFRS-
reporting firms. Further to the recent request in the IASB Agenda Consultation and various 
initiatives of other international, and standard-setting, bodies (FRC 2019; EFRAG 2019 and 
FASB 2021), in this study we address this lacuna. Specifically, by drawing on listed companies 
from 39 countries (40,241 firm-year observations) that have converged their national standards 
to IFRS or adopted IFRS, for the five-year period 2015 to 2019, we collected and summarised 
evidence on how many companies capitalise SDC during the year (capitalisers) and how many 
report R&D costs in the income statement but do not capitalise SDC during the year (non-
capitalisers). This evidence is provided in aggregate and also at a country and industry level. 
Key findings include the following. The data shows that almost two-thirds of the firm-year 
observations in the sample capitalise SDCs. This suggests that companies very frequently 
recognise and report SDCs separately. This contrasts with Mazzi et al.’s report (2019b) on 
general R&D costs, in which 62% of the sample are shown to expense such costs. The high 
frequency of SDC capitalisation we identify holds even though the amounts involved can be 
considered immaterial relative to the companies’ total assets and/or market values. At a 
country/regional level, however, we find significant differences in the percentage of 
capitalising firms and the SDC asset intensity on companies’ balance sheets. While firms from 
Asia show a greater tendency to recognise SDCs separately on the balance sheet than do firms 
in Oceania and Europe, the SDC asset intensity is far smaller than for firms in these other 
regions. At a sector level, firms in the Consumer Discretionary, Financials, Real Estate and 
Utilities Sectors exhibit the largest proportion of capitalisers (it is greater than 70%). Firms in 
the Telecommunications industry exhibit the highest net SDC asset intensity, followed by firms 
in Technology and Consumer Discretionary.  
Of the firms that complete material business combinations in a given year, a large 
proportion capitalise both SDCs and R&D in the year. When compared with firms that do not 
capitalise SDCs, firms that do so are more likely to be larger, riskier, have higher leverage, 
employ one of the Big Four auditors, have more international sales, have incentives to 
capitalise SDCs to meet their earnings targets, capitalise other development costs and have 
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concluded material business combinations during the year. These same characteristics 
associate positively with the magnitude of amounts capitalised. Even so, firm size, employing 
a Big Four auditor, and making international sales are not significant factors affecting the 
decision to capitalise SDCs for the sub-sample of firms that have material business 
combinations. Further, book to market, firm size, having a Big Four auditor, international sales, 
frequency of R&D capitalisation and being headquartered in a civic-law country or a country 
with highly skilled labour and better health infrastructure are not significant determinants of 
the amounts of SDCs capitalised in the sub-sample with material business combinations. 
Hence, these characteristics are related to the levels of SDC capitalisation only for firms 
without material business combinations. The results from the separate sample focusing on the 
years before and after the implementation of IFRS 3 (R) in 2009 suggest that the 
implementation of the revised standard does not influence a firm’s decision to capitalise SDCs 
or the magnitude of SDC capitalisation, even if it has conducted material business 
combinations. 
The key recommendations from these findings are as follows. The high frequency of 
capitalisation of SDCs, in direct contrast to the prior evidence of relative lack of capitalisation 
of development costs of new products and processes (ie R&D-related costs) under IAS 38, 
reinforces the call for revision to the criteria of capitalisation of other development costs in  
IAS 38. The fact that having material business combinations is associated with a larger number 
of capitalisers and higher amounts of capitalised SDCs suggests that IFRS 3 does achieve its 
objectives for the separate recognition of SDCs. Nonetheless, the implementation of IFRS 3(R) 
does not seem to have had an effect (and hence has not improved financial reporting) in this 
respect, relative to the previous standard. No further revision of IFRS 3 appears pertinent, at 
least as far as the recognition of SDCs is concerned. The significant differences in the 
percentage of capitalising firms and SDC asset intensity on companies’ balance sheets across 
countries/regions should alert users of financial statements, preparers, auditors and/or enforcers 
of financial information to the differential reporting incentives and contextual influential 
factors across different countries, which result in significant variations in reporting practices. 
Finally, although we observe relatively good disclosure practices on the issue of SDCs, IAS 38 
and auditors and enforcing bodies could encourage more refined disclosures in assisting firms 
to distinguish how much of the capitalised amounts of SDC relate to externally acquired or 





5.2 Limitations and directions for future research 
As in every research study, the results reported above are subject to a number of common 
limitations and caveats. First, the firm-level data we used is provided by commercial databases. 
These may contain errors and misclassifications. Second, certain firms may engage in R&D 
but may not separately report any R&D expense in the income statement or any SDC asset on 
the balance sheet. These companies are not included in the sample. In practice, their inclusion 
is unlikely to affect our results because these firms have low R&D intensity, and presumably 
low materiality. Third, certain firms may capitalise SDC costs but may not report these as a 
separate category of intangible assets; some companies may have (mis)classified such amounts 
as part of general development costs capitalised. Hence, we cannot classify them as capitalisers 
in our sample. Similarly, it is likely that some companies may develop software internally and 
part of this expenditure is treated as an expense in the income statement. The databases that we 
rely on for the data collection do not capture such amounts separately. It is likely that 
companies merge these expensed costs with other R&D-related expenses. The implications 
from these potential (mis)classifications would be negligible for the tests on and conclusions 
about the amounts capitalised, because it is presumed that the non-separate reporting of such 
amounts is due to their small, non-material, magnitude. Fourth, we rely on econometric 
techniques to identify the expected practice of SDC capitalisation. While we have made every 
effort to develop a model that accurately predicts the expected accounting treatment of SDCs, 
we recognise that this may misclassify some companies.  
Future research could examine any consequences of the decision to capitalise SDCs and 
of the amounts capitalised on various equity and debt market outcomes. Further, insights about 
the decision to capitalise SDCs and about the amounts capitalised, while comparing IFRS and 
US GAAP reporters would be pertinent. Additionally, future research could consider the views 
of preparers on their respective accounting treatments of R&D costs compared with those costs 
associated with SDCs. This could shed useful light on the differences, in practice, between 
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Appendix A: Information for the firm-year observations excluded from our 
analysis  
Table A1 shows the distribution, by country and year, for the firm-year observations that do 
not report R&D expense in the income statement and do not recognise an SDC asset on the 
balance sheet, which were hence excluded from our analysis. For comparative purposes, Table 
A1 also shows the number of firm-year observations included in our analysis, along with the 
resultant ‘retention rate’. This latter column indicates that, on average, the percentage of firm-
year observations that report an R&D expense in the income statement and/or recognise an 
SDC asset in the year is about 52%. Thus, overall, we include a large number of firms from a 
large number of IFRS reporting countries in our sample.  
We note, however, that for 11 (5) countries the retention rate is below 30% (20%). On the 
one other hand, for China and Japan (Korea and Taiwan) the retention rate is above 90% (80%). 
This suggests that a significant majority of firms in these countries report an R&D expense in 
the income statement and/or recognise an SDC asset in the year. Further, this, and the fact that 
a very large number of firms are listed in each of China, Korea and Taiwan, explains why our 
sample heavily represents firms in the Asian region.  
Like Table A1, Table A2 reports the distribution of firm-year observations excluded from 
and included in our analysis, across industries. Overall, with the exception of firms in the Real 
Estate industry, we included a very large number of firm-year observations from each industry 
in our analysis. 
Looking at more details, the data in Table A2 indicates that, probably as expected because 
of their operations, our sample includes the majority of firms in the Health Care (76%), 














Table A1: Distribution of firm-year observations excluded from and included in our 
analysis, by country 






Argentina 35 37 34 33 39 178 84 32.06% 
Australia 690 603 620 631 631 3,175 1,326 29.46% 
Austria 29 24 24 24 19 120 113 48.50% 
Belgium 54 52 56 50 50 262 204 43.78% 
Brazil 85 80 78 74 63 380 481 55.87% 
Canada 633 520 502 495 481 2,631 1,030 28.13% 
Chile 109 88 81 76 75 429 307 41.71% 
China 257 216 188 174 180 1,015 11,058 91.59% 
Colombia 0 14 13 11 11 49 18 26.87% 
Denmark 71 57 55 59 56 298 168 36.05% 
Finland 47 51 55 50 51 254 257 50.29% 
France 234 234 225 207 171 1,071 902 45.72% 
Germany 152 144 140 143 121 700 960 57.83% 
Greece 87 76 69 65 21 318 247 43.72% 
Hong Kong 760 814 864 946 860 4,244 1,491 26.00% 
India 1,407 1,267 1,259 1,239 1,060 6,232 3,184 33.81% 
Indonesia 343 337 338 352 254 1,624 383 19.08% 
Ireland 14 14 14 13 12 67 79 54.11% 
Israel 191 171 174 181 177 894 495 35.64% 
Italy 161 150 154 158 146 769 300 28.06% 
Japan 2 3 1 3 6 15 414 96.50% 
Jordan 145 123 113 116 48 545 74 11.95% 
Korea  210 162 165 140 161 838 4,986 85.61% 
Malaysia 462 524 534 532 612 2,664 325 10.87% 
Mexico 73 69 75 81 89 387 89 18.70% 
Netherlands 37 33 35 32 24 161 236 59.45% 
New Zealand 58 56 53 52 52 271 228 45.69% 
Norway 83 88 93 91 91 446 204 31.38% 
Peru 46 41 43 45 50 225 60 21.05% 
Philippines 4 7 9 11 5 36 12 25.00% 
Portugal 25 18 20 15 16 94 60 38.96% 
Singapore 48 46 43 44 298 479 93 16.26% 
South Africa 150 142 143 144 132 711 430 37.69% 
Spain 54 56 53 53 42 258 281 52.13% 
Sweden 191 199 212 234 241 1,077 547 33.68% 
Switzerland 1 2 2 1 1 7 12 63.16% 
Taiwan 296 292 303 283 313 1,487 6,481 81.34% 
Turkey 188 172 165 169 145 839 528 38.62% 
United Kingdom 505 467 444 423 339 2,178 2,094 49.02% 
Venezuela 3 2 2 2 1 10 0 0.00% 
Total 7,940 7,451 7,451 7,452 7,144 37,438 40,241 51.80% 
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Table A2: Distribution of firm-year observations excluded from and included in our 
analysis, by industry 






Basic Materials 1,455 1,274 1,253 1,232 1,174 6,388 5,101 44.40% 
Consumer 
Discretionary 1,456 1,388 1,411 1,364 1,300 6,919 
7,449 51.84% 
Consumer Staples 551 533 536 534 517 2,671 2,710 50.36% 
Financials 955 866 850 873 840 4,384 2,100 32.39% 
Health Care 219 236 248 252 261 1,216 3,808 75.80% 
Industrials 1,590 1,523 1,534 1,529 1,463 7,639 9,056 54.24% 
Real Estate 845 811 823 846 809 4,134 915 18.12% 
Technology 474 443 441 444 434 2,236 6,401 74.11% 
Telecommunications 159 165 150 165 143 782 1,710 68.62% 
Utilities 236 212 205 213 203 1,069 991 48.11% 
Total 7,940 7,451 7,451 7,452 7,144 37,438 40,241 51.80% 
 
Table A3 (Panel A) presents the descriptive statistics for key firm-level variables for the firm-
year observations that are excluded from our analysis. Panel B of Table A3 contrasts this 
information with the corresponding characteristics of the firm-year observations we analyse in 
this report.  
The data reveals that, on average, firms excluded from the analysis (ie firms that do not 
report R&D expense in the income statement and do not recognise an SDC asset on the balance 
sheet) are smaller in size and more leveraged, have significantly lower levels of international 
sales, and  invest more in tangible fixed assets. and a lower percentage of them are audited by 
a Big Four auditor.  
Table A3: Descriptive statistics for firm-year observations excluded from our analysis 
Panel A: firm-year observations excluded from our analysis 
VARIABLE N mean sd min median max 
BM 37,438 1.174 1.124 0.031 0.849 7.259 
SIZE 37,438 15.826 4.924 7.709 15.322 31.749 
Beta 37,438 0.782 0.733 –1.462 0.725 4.48 
Lev 37,438 0.894 1.547 0 0.387 9.861 
BIG4 37,438 0.333 0.471 0 0 1 
CAPEX 37,438 0.082 0.143 0 0.027 1.004 
INTSALES 37,438 13.229 28.383 0 0 100 
AGE 37,438 17.261 8.985 3 17 46 
Panel B: firm-year observations included in our analysis 
VARIABLE N mean sd min median max 
BM 40,241 0.686 0.605 0.035 0.508 3.926 
SIZE 40,241 18.409 4.461 8.699 17.892 30.873 
Beta 40,241 0.975 0.684 –1.435 0.957 6.764 
Lev 40,241 0.743 1.18 0 0.368 8.107 
BIG4 40,241 0.402 0.49 0 0 1 
CAPEX 40,241 0.057 0.091 0 0.024 0.606 
INTSALES 40,241 26.479 34.289 0 5.3 100 
AGE 40,241 16.306 9.115 3 16 46 
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Appendix B: Variable definition 
Variable Definition Datastream code or other source 
rdnetasset is the net R&D asset on the balance sheet, 
scaled by total assets 
Net development costs: WC02504 
Total assets: WC02999 
sdnetasset is the net SDC asset on the balance sheet, 
scaled by total assets 
Net software development costs: 
WC18299 
Total assets: WC02999 
SDAsset is the capitalised amount of SDC in the year, 
measured as the change in net SDC asset 
(sdnetasset) plus amortisation of software, 
scaled by the market value of equity 
Net software development costs: 
WC18299 
Amortisation of software: WC01157 
Market Capitalisation: WC08001 
SDCAPD is an indicator variable equal to one (1) if a 
company capitalises SDC during the year (ie 
when SDAsset is greater than zero (0)) 
 
RDExp is the research and development expense 
recognised in the income statement, scaled by 
the market value of equity 
R&D expense: WC01201 
Market Capitalisation: WC08001 
RDAsset is the capitalised amount of R&D in the year, 
measured as the change in net R&D asset 
(rdnetasset) plus amortisation of R&D scaled, 
by the market value of equity 
Net development costs: WC02504 
Amortisation of R&D: WC01153 
Market Capitalisation: WC08001 
CAP is an indicator variable equal to one (1) if a 
company capitalises R&D during the year (ie 
when RDAsset is greater than zero (0)) 
Net development costs: WC02504 
BM is the book-to-market value of equity ratio Common equity: WC03501 
Market Capitalisation: WC08001 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of 
equity, measured at the fiscal year end 
Market Capitalisation: WC08001 
BETA is the firm beta estimated using 12 months of 
returns over each firm’s local market index  
Datastream regression formula 
LEV is the total debt-to-book value of equity Total debt: WC03255 
Common equity: WC03501 
BIG4 is an indicator variable equal to one (1) if the 
company's financial statements are audited by 
one of the Big Four auditors and zero (0) 
otherwise 
TR.BSAuditorCode 
CAPEX is the level of investment in tangible fixed 
assets for the year, scaled by the market value 
of equity 
Capital Expenditure: WC04601 
Market Capitalization: WC08001 
INTSALES is international sales as a percentage of total 
sales 
IntSalesPerc: WC07101 
RDValue is R&D value, measured as the difference 
between the market value of equity and book 
value of equity, less the amount of R&D and 
SDC capitalised during the year divided by 
the sum of current and lagged annual R&D 
expenditure  
Common equity: WC03501 
Market Capitalisation: WC08001 
R&D expenditure: 
RDExp+SDAsset+RDAsset 
RDInt is the R&D intensity measured as R&D 
expenditure (see above), divided by total 
assets less the amount of R&D or SDC 
capitalised during the year 
R&D expenditure: 
RDExp+SDAsset+RDAsset 
Total assets: WC02999 
PAST_BEAT is equal to one (1) if prior year earnings are 
higher than current earnings, assuming full 
expensing of SDC capitalised in the year and 




prior year earnings are lower than current 
earnings, assuming full capitalisation of R&D 
expense and 0 otherwise (see also Dinh et al. 
2016). Earnings refer to income before extra 
items/preferred dividends  
ZERO_BEAT is equal to one (1) if earnings, assuming full 
expensing of SDC capitalised in the year, are 
negative, and earnings assuming full 
capitalisation of R&D expense are positive 
and zero (0) otherwise (see also Dinh et al. 
2016). ‘Earnings’ refer to income before extra 
items/preferred dividends 
Net income before extra items/preferred 
dividends: WC01551 
BENCH_BEAT is equal to one (1) if PAST_BEAT and/or 
ZERO_BEAT are equal to one (1) and zero (0) 
otherwise 
 
AGE Firm age in years. In multivariate analysis we 
use its natural logarithm 
Base date 
BC is equal to one (1) if there is a material 
business combination and zero (0) otherwise. 
Material business combination is considered if 
the consideration accounts for 5% to previous 
year's book value of equity. 
Compustat: Acquisition expense: ACQ  
Common equity: CEQ 
ANTISELF (anti self-dealing index) is a measure of legal 
protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate insiders  
La Porta et al. (2008)  
CIV_COM is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
zero (0) if the company is headquartered in a 
common law country and one (1) in a civil 
law country 
La Porta et al. (1998)  
CORR Corruption is the percentile rank of control of 
corruption multiplied by –1. The higher the 
value, the higher is the corruption in a country 
World Bank (2010). Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) Project 
Healthinfrastructure is the country-level health infrastructure IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 
2021 
Skilledlabour is the country-level skilled labour that  is 
readily available  
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 
2021 
Scientificresearchlegislation is the country-level scientific research 
legislation measuring whether laws relating to 
scientific research encourage innovation 
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 
2021 
GDPGrowth is the annual growth rate of gross domestic 
product (GDP) 




Appendix C: Examples of companies’ disclosures 
This Appendix provides extracts from the financial statements of 15 firms, as indicative 
examples of good disclosure practice, including mentions of SDC capitalisation as a key audit 
matter in auditors’ reports. These firms have very high SDC asset intensity in the year 2019. 
Thus, for these firms, SDCs would be considered an important aspect and detailed and clear 
disclosures would be pertinent.  
